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1. Introduction 
Traditionally, monetary authorities have intervened directly in foreign exchange 
markets, impacting exchange rate levels and their fluctuations by actually trading currencies. 
In recent years, however, actual intervention has been supplemented or supplanted by oral 
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intervention, i.e. official communications via policy announcements or other means such as 
informal meetings with market participants intended to mitigate exchange rate trends by 
influencing market expectations (Fratzscher, 2006, 2008a, 2008b; Beine et al., 2009; Sakata 
and Takeda, 2013). For major economies like the US and EU member nations, there has been 
almost no direct market intervention by the authorities since the mid of 1990’s; however, the 
frequency of oral interventions has increased. 
In China, both actual and oral interventions are performed by Chinese monetary 
authorities, but in a secret way. However, we do know the occasions when the People’s Bank 
of China (PBOC) makes statements directly to the foreign exchange market or talks to the 
state-owned banks. In recent years, the PBOC has announced that it will gradually reduce 
direct or “regular” interventions in the Chinese exchange market. But given PBOC’s long 
standing of extensive intervention, this change is likely to be more form than substance.  
China has been internationally noted for the extensity and sophistication of its foreign 
exchange interventions. Generally, three major forms can be identified for the Chinese 
intervention: (1) Direct sales or purchases of foreign currencies by PBOC in the marketplace. 
(2) Setting and adjusting of the official central parity rate and the range around which the 
daily trading prices are allowed to fluctuate. (3) PBOC’s oral intervention in the form of 
policy briefing, moral persuasion, formal and informal meetings, and telephone conversations. 
The first two are regularly operated by the PBOC and the central bank’s indication of a 
gradual reduction in regular interventions is likely to mean a possible change to engaging 
more in oral intervention. 
Although many researchers have studied China’s exchange rate policy and have been 
aware of intervention as a central feature of that policy, to date there has been very little 
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research attention directed toward China’s oral intervention. This paper fills the gap in the 
foreign exchange intervention literature by considering the Chinese case. 
Oral intervention as a policy tool has found to have mixed effects in existing literature. 
Recent studies have shown some progress in mitigating the problems in previous research. 
For example, the event study methodology has been applied in intervention studies, which is 
considered to be better at capturing the clustered property of interventions compared to time-
series analysis (Fratzcher 2008a; Gnabo and Teiletche, 2009). 
This paper follows the event study approach to explore China’s oral intervention in 
foreign exchange to better our understanding of China’s exchange rate. We focus on domestic 
as well as international aspects of China’s exchange rate communication, China’s response to 
international calls for exchange rate adjustment, particularly those form the USA, is 
considered.  
We analyse the effects of oral intervention on the Chinese yuan/US dollar (CNY/USD) 
rate from 22 July 2005 to 22 July 2013. Four event window lengths, of 2, 5, 10 and 15 days, 
are deployed to check when the effects of oral intervention occur. Four dimensions - event, 
direction, reversal and smoothing - are investigated to test for the impacts of the events. We 
also employ more extensive tests in the empirical investigation. The event study approach 
that is commonly used in other similar research is based almost exclusively on the sign tests. 
In this research we extend the literature by employing the rank tests along with the sign tests, 
to check to what extent the communications may have the desired effects. We also compare 
the results of parametric and nonparametric tests, as the nonparametric tests may yield 
additional insights in the context of the event studies.  
We find that exchange rate communications could help the Chinese central bank 
impact RMB exchange rate levels moving in desired directions. Based on the whole sample 
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results, while against the event criterion, exchange rate communications are not successful, in 
the reversal dimension, all the event window lengths under examination are significant. 
Finally, the longer the event window length is, the more significant the effects are in the four 
dimensions. We also test the effects of the international aspects of China’s exchange rate 
communications, particularly in the case of the US calling for appreciation of the RMB 
exchange rate.  As the events are significant in all dimensions, the results suggest that such 
calls can influence movements of the Chinese exchange rate, and hence by and large the 
Chinese authorities are responsive to American pressure for RMB appreciation.  Finally, 
using the range-based variance model to get volatility, we find confirmative evidence of the 
effect of successive exchange rate communications on calming the exchange rate movement 
in terms of excess volatility.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 comprises a review of the 
literature on oral intervention. Section 3 introduces the forms of intervention in China with a 
focus on China’s oral intervention. Section 4 explains the event study methodology; it defines 
the events, event windows and criteria, and describes the parametric and nonparametric tests. 
Section 5 discusses the estimation results. Section 6 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2. Related Literature 
In recent decades, exchange rate communication has become an increasingly 
important policy tool for monetary authorities (Fratzscher, 2006). Using reports issued by the 
newswire service Reuters News, Fratzscher (2006) analyses exchange rate communication on 
the basis of two sets of search criteria. They are used to extract all statements in which policy 
makers expressed a view about the domestic exchange rate. The search terms are the phrase 
‘exchange rate’ or the name of the exchange rate, such as the US dollar for the United States, 
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and the title or name of relevant policy makers. Then, Fratzscher (2006) classifies the 
contents of the statements according to whether they support a stronger domestic currency or 
a weaker one, or are neutral: 
𝐼𝑂𝑡 = {
+1  𝑖𝑓 ′𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔′𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡;
0            𝑖𝑓 ′𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠′𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡;
−1        𝑖𝑓 ′𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔′𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡;
                                                                       (1) 
Using the above classification process, Fratzscher (2006) identifies exchange rate 
communication in the Group of Three (G3), comprising the USA, Japan and the euro area, 
from 1990 to 2003. The findings show that from the mid-1990s the United States and the 
euro area has practically abandoned the use of actual purchases and sales in FX markets, and 
shifted to almost exclusive use of communication to affect exchange rate developments. The 
Japanese authorities, however, has intensified both actual intervention and exchange rate 
communication. The empirical results based on an EGARCH framework indicate that 
communication not only exhibits a significant contemporaneous effect on exchange rates, but 
also moves forward exchange rates in the desired direction up to a horizon of 6 months. 
Moreover, communication is found to reduce exchange rate volatility and uncertainty, 
whereas actual interventions tend to have the opposite effect. Overall, communication tends 
to be a fairly effective policy tool over the medium term. 
In a subsequent study, Fratzscher (2008) investigates the channels through which 
communication works. Using the same data and search classification process as in his 2006 
research, Fratzscher (2008) employs a standard asset-pricing framework. The research 
provides two key findings: first, G3 communication policies have constituted an effective 
policy tool in influencing exchange rates in the desired direction; second, communication has 
been effective independently of the stance and direction of the monetary policy and the 
occurrence of actual interventions. Meanwhile, the effects of communication are strongly 
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related to the degree of uncertainty and the positioning of participants in FX markets. Taken 
together, the results provide support for micro-based approaches to exchange rate modelling 
and are consistent with the argument that oral and actual interventions function through a 
coordination channel rather than a signalling channel. 
One key question for Fratzscher (2008) is whether communication is successful in 
inducing a permanent, long-term effect on exchange rates. Still using the same data as in his 
2006 research, Fratzscher (2008) employs an event study methodology based on four criteria 
- ‘event’, ‘direction’, ‘reversal’, and ‘smoothing’ - and nonparametric sign tests. The 
empirical findings for the success of interventions based on these criteria provide strong 
evidence for the medium- to long-term effectiveness of both oral interventions and actual 
interventions by G3 authorities since 1990. Then, Fratzscher (2008) attempts to gauge the 
channels through which these two types of interventions function. He tests hypotheses for the 
channels: if the portfolio balance channel is dominant, one would expect that oral 
interventions should have little or no effect on exchange rates; if the signalling channel is 
working, a close relationship between monetary policy and the effectiveness of interventions 
would be expected; if the coordination channel is relevant, interventions may be most 
effective in times of large market uncertainty or when exchange rates strongly deviate from 
fundamentals (Taylor, 2004).  
In order to test the coordination channel, Fratzscher (2008) applies a formal test using 
odds ratios in a logit-model framework. The findings show that both oral and actual 
interventions are effective under large market uncertainty and when exchange rates deviate 
substantially from fundamentals. Fratzscher (2008) also finds that the success of 
communication and actual interventions is largely unrelated to monetary policy, thus 
suggesting that interventions function primarily through a coordination channel. 
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Using Dow Jones and Reuters press reports to identify oral interventions during 1989-
2003 for the USD/DEM (the EUR/USD after 1999), and during 1991-2003 for the YEN/USD, 
Beine et al. (2009) assess how communication influences exchange rate levels and exchange 
rate volatility. They consider two types of communication: ex post communication includes 
all the official statements detected by market participants that are issued after direct 
interventions, while ex ante communication comprises statements issued at G7 meetings or 
potential future interventions issued by monetary authorities. The results indicate that oral 
intervention has effects on both exchange rate level and exchange rate volatility. Moreover, 
statements by monetary authorities on exchange rate policy can be a valuable complementary 
tool to actual exchange rate operations. The authors also conduct robustness checks for a 
range of factors: change in intervention regime, size of the intervention, the coordination 
channel, official statements as separate policy instruments, and the distinction between 
announced and unannounced interventions. 
Sakata and Takeda (2013) attempt to complement Fratzscher’s (2008) study, which 
examines only the effect of announcements made by main monetary authorities and does not 
exclude the possibility that other speakers may also influence the market. Using Reuters 
Japanese News, Sakata and Takeda (2013) collect statements by Japanese monetary 
authorities from 1 January 1995 to 31 May 2011. Then, following Fratzscher (2008), they 
regard oral intervention as an event, and define the success or failure of oral intervention by 
measuring whether it meets certain criteria. They use ‘direction’ as the criterion to analyse 
whether oral interventions can influence the exchange rate as the monetary authorities hope. 
In their study, Sakata and Takeda (2013) construct dummy variables based on 14 points 
(direction, specific rate, IA-announcement, suggestion, non-comment, watching, attitude, 
coordination, vice-minister, minister, MoF-member, BoJ, Japanese, International), and apply 
logit analysis to investigate what forms of oral intervention are most effective. Results from 
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this event study suggest that the market only responds to the statements made by main 
monetary authorities. In addition, Sakata and Takeda (2013) find that market participants give 
high credence to announcements that strike a decidedly positive or negative tone about the 
current exchange rate. Moreover, their results indicate that the effect of oral interventions 
depend on the speaker and the content; consequently, they provide policy implications. 
Using Japanese data from April 1991 to September 2004, Bernal and Gnabo (2009) 
classify three types of intervention: actual intervention, oral intervention and confirmed 
intervention. Confirmed intervention is an actual intervention accompanied by an 
announcement either confirming its occurrence or clarifying its purpose. Bernal and Gnabo 
(2009) collect the oral and confirmed intervention information from the Factiva online 
database. They estimate an ordered probit model to test determinants of different types of 
interventions, and then use an event study approach to examine the effectiveness of the 
interventions. Their results indicate that the Japanese authorities tend to adopt stronger 
measures when the behaviour of the exchange rate becomes more unfavourable. This 
suggests that words and deeds are coordinated only in extreme cases. Overall, interventions 
are found to be moderately successful in correcting undesirable exchange rate developments, 
especially volatility of the exchange rate movements. 
Fratzscher (2004) discusses three elements of foreign exchange interventions: 
exchange rate developments, monetary policy and the coordination of interventions. First, 
with regard to exchange rate developments, intervention focuses on arriving at a particular 
exchange rate level, decreasing deviations of the exchange rate from the desired level, or 
reducing volatility. Second, through the signalling channel, intervention seems closely 
associated with monetary policy. Third, in the international arena, monetary authorities have 
frequently coordinated their interventions across countries to increase the effectiveness on 
exchange rates (Bonser-Neal and Tanner, 1996; Beine et al., 2002). Fratzscher (2004) 
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conducts a logit analysis to test these three characteristics of Japanese actual and oral 
interventions. The results show that both actual and oral interventions follow a leaning-
against-the-wind pattern, and are more frequent when exchange rate deviation and volatility 
are high. In addition, both actual and oral interventions are mostly consistent with and 
supportive of monetary policy changes. Furthermore, they are coordinated domestically and 
internationally. 
The literature on China’s intervention has not covered the oral type of intervention; 
nor has it used an event study approach. This paper aims to fill that critical void. 
 
3. Foreign Exchange Interventions in China 
Differing from the US, Japan and other mature economies, China operates foreign 
exchange intervention according to its own unique fashion. The Chinese monetary authorities 
intervene in the foreign exchange market secretly and the intervention takes a variety of 
forms. Specifically, quantity intervention takes place via purchase or sale of foreign 
currencies, price intervention is accomplished via setting the central parity rate for market 
trading and its allowed fluctuation band, while the authorities also engage in oral intervention 
through issuing government statements or other means of communication. 
 
3.1.Forms of China’s Intervention 
Three forms of intervention used by China are as follows: 
(1) The central bank (CB) intervenes by directly purchasing or selling foreign 
exchange in the marketplace. In the case of purchase intervention, the central bank 
trades foreign currencies with domestic notes; in selling intervention, it pours 
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foreign reserves into the market and so we term this type of intervention ‘quantity 
intervention’.  As it involves the central bank participating in market transactions, 
it may be also called CB intervention, 
(2) The central bank controls the level and growth of the RMB exchange rate by 
specifying the central parity rate (CPR) and the range around which the daily 
trading prices are allowed to fluctuate. We call this ‘price intervention’.  It may 
also be termed as CPR intervention, since it involves the setting and adjustment of 
the central parity. Only rarely would the Chinese monetary authorities intervene 
through adjusting the interest rate or changing commercial banks’ required reserve 
rate. 
 
(3) Intervention may also take place in the form of policy briefing, moral persuasion, 
formal and informal meetings, and telephone conversations. We call this oral 
intervention. It is straightforward for the Chinese central bank to effectuate this 
form of intervention by instructing or directing the attention of banks, especially 
the state-owned ones, which are dominant forces in the Chinese foreign exchange 
market, towards ‘things to note’.   
In this paper, we choose to focus on the third type listed above, i.e. oral intervention, 
whereby in order to influence the RMB exchange rate against the dollar, the monetary 
authorities communicate with the foreign exchange market.  
 
3.2.Measuring China’s Oral Intervention 
In China’s foreign exchange market, oral intervention may be in the form of exchange 
rate communications by the domestic monetary authorities, but it may also have an 
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international dimension when the intervention takes place as a result of outside calls, such as 
appreciation pressure from American requests.  
With regard to domestic communication, because the purpose of this paper is to 
measure the extent to which exchange rate communication could affect the foreign exchange 
market in the intended way, we choose to focus on statements by the relevant Chinese 
monetary authorities, including the PBOC, Ministry of Finance and State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange (SAFE), and exchange rate speeches by Chinese political and economic 
leaders such as China’s President, Premier, and the PBOC governor. With regard to the 
exchange rate pressure coming from outside China, which is often calling for appreciation of 
the Chinese currency, we look at statements made during US-China presidential visits and 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue, and official statements on exchange rates by the US 
President, Secretary of the Treasury and senators.  
To collect the data on domestic and foreign exchange rate communications we extract 
headline statements and speeches from the newswire service Reuters News, as this is the 
most likely source of information for market participants (Fratzscher, 2006 and 2008; Beine 
et al., 2009; Sakata and Takeda, 2013). Reuters US News is used for data on outside 
appreciation pressure, and Reuters Chinese News for information on domestic 
communication. In most cases, media reports from such sources are published within minutes 
of a policymaker’s statement or speech, which allows us to conduct the empirical analysis 
using the data at daily frequency.  For news about developments regarding China’s foreign 
exchange market, we additionally use information from the official websites of the PBOC 
and SAFE.1 Reports from these sources can be regarded as information released by the 
                                                             
1 The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) website is: http://www.pbc.gov.cn/, last accessed on 18 March 2015. 
  The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) website is: http://www.safe.gov.cn/, last accessed 
on 18 March 2015. 
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Chinese monetary authorities. On top of these, we use the newswire service of China.org.cn2 
as the official source of information from China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) and the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).  
In seeking information about outside appreciation pressure we employ the following 
two search criteria: The first comprises the phrase ‘exchange rate’ or the name of the 
currency renminbi (RMB), or the Chinese yuan for the People’s Republic of China, and the 
title or name of the US President, Treasury Secretary or senators. As shown in Table 1, 
during the sample period there was a change of US President, so we use both Bush and 
Obama as search terms, and there were four US Treasury Secretaries, so we use the names 
Snow, Paulson, Geithner and Lew in the search. Based on the first criterion, we discover 
indications of calls from the American side on the RMB exchange rate. The second criterion 
relates to the reports, news briefs or statements in relation to high level US-China bilateral 
meetings. This criterion comprises the name of the exchange rate, along with the name of the 
high level US-China bilateral meeting, such as presidential visits to and from the USA and 
the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which has taken place once every year since 
2009. 
Table 1 
Names and periods of tenure for US presidents and treasury secretaries 
US President 
Name: George W. Bush Barack Obama 
Time: Before 20/01/2009 After 21/01/2009 
 
US Treasury Secretary 
Name: John Snow Henry Paulson Timothy Geithner Jack Lew 
Time: Before 
30/06/2006 
10/07/2006—
20/01/2009 
20/01/2009—
25/01/2013 
After 
28/02/2013 
 
                                                             
2 China.org.cn website is: http://www.china.org.cn/, last accessed on 18 March 2015. 
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For domestic communication, we choose Reuters Chinese News, the PBOC and 
SAFE websites, and China.org.cn as sources. As with Reuters US News, we use two search 
criteria for Reuters Chinese News. The first comprises the name of the Chinese exchange rate 
and the name of the Chinese President, Premier, or PBOC governor (see Table 2). The main 
purpose is to find speeches on the RMB exchange rate made by relevant authorities in China. 
The second criterion comprises the name of the exchange rate along with a phrase connoting 
a major economic or financial event in China, such as ‘National Financial Work Conference’, 
or ‘Central Economic Work Conference’, which issues statements about the Chinese 
exchange rate policy. Then, we use the PBOC and SAFE websites as sources for the China 
Monetary Policy Report and the Annual Report of the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange, respectively.  These documents report the evolution of China’s exchange rate 
policy in a particular year and indicate official intentions for the future development of the 
policy. Finally, we use the newswire service China.org.cn to collect NPC and CPPCC 
statements relevant to the Chinese foreign exchange market. 
 
Table 2 
Names and periods of tenure for Chinese president, premier, and governor of the PBOC 
 Chinese President Premier Governor of the 
PBOC 
Name Hu Jintao Xi Jinping Wen Jiabao Li Keqiang Zhou Xiaochuan 
Tenure Before 
14/03/2013 
After 
14/03/2013 
Before 
15/03/2013 
After 
15/03/2013 
22/07/2005- 
22/07/2013 
 
Then, in order to provide a systematic classification of the meaning of statements and 
official speeches, we use the content analysis technique to extract relevant information 
(Holsti, 1969; Kassarjian, 1977).  Given the high research interest in the extent to which 
communication of the views of domestic or US governments about the Chinese currency 
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would affect the RMB exchange rate, we have a classification of the media of the 
communication as follows: 
𝐼𝑂𝑡 =
{
 
 
 
 
5                                     𝑈𝑆 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑐ℎ;
4                 𝑈𝑆 − 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔;
3                    𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔;
2                       𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑐ℎ;
1                       𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡.
                                                                             (2) 
where 𝐼𝑂𝑡 is the oral communication at time t. There are five channels through which oral 
intervention may take place. Domestic oral intervention occurs when a statement or speech is 
issued by the relevant authorities in China, usually at the PBOC or SAFE. Speeches by 
certain domestic officials, such as China’s President, Premier or central bank governor, may 
also constitute intervention, since they are in a position to change the formulation of the 
Chinese exchange rate policy. Their speeches may send messages regarding their judgement 
on the current status of the RMB exchange rate or about possible changes they intend to make 
to the RMB exchange rate in the future. Domestic meeting intervention occurs when the 
content of meetings, such as those of the NPC or CPPCC, and the two central work 
conferences specified above, concerns the exchange rate. When statements issued during US-
China presidential visits and Strategic and Economic Dialogue call for appreciation of the 
RMB exchange rate, this is defined as US-China meeting intervention. Finally, when the US 
speaks to China seeking appreciation of the yuan we term it US speech intervention as in 
some way and after some delay China may response to the call by changing the RMB 
exchange rate. While all US-China meetings and US speech interventions are concerned only 
with appreciating the RMB exchange rate, the other oral intervention types may have the tone 
of either appreciation or depreciation (±1). 
For example, according to media reports on 05/04/2006, before the US visit by the 
then Chinese President Hu Jintao, the then American Treasury Secretary John Snow claimed 
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that, while appreciation of the Chinese yuan could not be achieved immediately, the RMB 
should increase in that year. In another example, on 28/06/2010, President Obama expressed 
the hope that the Chinese yuan could appreciate more quickly. According to our classification, 
these two dates can be categorized as types 5 and 4 of oral intervention, respectively.  
On 06/10/2006, the governor of the PBOC, Zhou Xiaochuan, indicated opposition to 
RMB appreciation, stating that it is essential to keep the RMB stable. Therefore, we mark that 
date as type 2 oral intervention. On 14/11/2006, the PBOC’s Monetary Policy Report stated 
that the flexibility of the RMB exchange rate regime was increasing, and reform of the 
exchange rate regime was well underway. These developments would increase public 
anticipation that appreciation would be more likely to occur. Thus, we mark that date as type 
1 of oral intervention. 
One advantage of using the newswire service is that statements and official speeches 
are interpreted by experienced professionals. Because this paper intends to analyse the market 
reaction to communication that actually becomes available to market participants, we use 
Reuters News, a news provider with a good professional reputation for the quality of its 
services.  
Table 3 shows the occurrence of the five types of oral intervention since 2005. There 
are some prominent features. Most importantly, we can identify distinct regimes of oral 
intervention over time. For instance, oral intervention happened less under the pegged 
exchange rate system: among the whole sample, the sub-period 2008/07/15-2010/06/22 saw 
the lowest number of oral interventions. This is because during that period central parity 
intervention was the main tool used by the central bank to influence the RMB exchange rate. 
With regard to domestic oral interventions and oral communications from the US, we find 
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that the largest numbers are for domestic and US speeches. This means that the main form of 
oral intervention is simply talking to the foreign exchange market. 
 
Table 3 
Number of exchange rate communications, 2005-2013 
 Total Domestic report Domestic speech 
2005/07/22-2013/07/22 362 
(271&-91) 
55 
(37&-18) 
138 
(46&-92) 
2005/07/22-2008/07/14 150 
(117&-33) 
20 
(16&-4) 
51 
(14&-27) 
2008/07/15-2010/06/22 84 
(37&-47) 
14 
(3&-11) 
37 
(6&-31) 
2010/06/23-2013/07/22 128 
(88&-40) 
21 
(18&-3) 
50 
(16&-34) 
 
 Domestic meeting US-China meeting US speech 
2005/07/22-2013/07/22 18 
(8&-10) 
22 129 
2005/07/22-2008/07/14 4 
(2&-2) 
17 58 
2008/07/15-2010/06/22 5 
(-5) 
3 25 
2010/06/23-2013/07/22 9 
(6&-3) 
2 46 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses refer to the oral interventions for appreciation (with a positive sign +) 
and depreciation (with a negative sign -). 
 
4. The Event Study Methodology 
4.1.History of Event Study Methodology 
Fama et al. (1969) were among the first to use the event study approach to finance 
research. Subsequently, Brow and Warner (1980 and 1985) elaborated the basics of the 
methodology (Binder, 1998).  The approach starts with the identification of the event. Then, 
pre-event and post-event periods can be defined (Gnabo and Teiletche, 2009). Based on 
Fatum and Hutchinson (2006) and Morel and Teiletche (2008), the approach deployed in the 
18 
 
foreign exchange field uses Equation (2) below to test two null hypotheses regarding changes 
in the exchange rate returns in the pre- and post-event periods: 
𝐻0
1: 𝐸(∆𝑀𝑖
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡) = 0  
𝐻0
2: 𝐸(∆𝑀𝑖
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − ∆𝑀𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑒) = 0                                                                                                             (3) 
These two hypotheses were tested by Fatum and Hutchinson (2006) for exchange rate 
returns. ∆𝑀𝑖
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
 and ∆𝑀𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑒
 are changes in the exchange rate movement of the pre- and post- 
-event periods, respectively. The first null hypothesis (𝐻0
1) is used to test whether intervention 
events cause significant changes in exchange rate movements in the post-event period, and 
this corresponds to the direction test. The second null hypothesis (𝐻0
2) is used to determine 
whether pre-event changes in the exchange rate are significantly different from post-event 
changes, and it corresponds to the reversal test and smoothing test. 
 
4.1.1. Event Studies in Advanced Countries 
An event study framework is better suited to the study of sporadic and intense periods 
of official intervention than are standard time-series studies (Fatum and Hutchison, 2003). 
Fatum and Hutchison (2003) use the daily Bundesbank intervention and Fed intervention 
variables during the period from 1 September 1985 to 31 December 1995. Following Frankel 
(1994) and Humpage (1999), Fatum and Hutchison (2003) take the direction and smoothing 
criteria as the measure of success, and introduce a new criterion, ‘reversal’. Using the 
nonparametric sign test and matched-sample test, they find strong evidence that sterilized 
intervention systemically affects the exchange rate in the short run. This means sterilized 
intervention may play a role in moving the exchange rate. The result is robust to changes in 
event window definitions over the short run and to controlling for central bank interest rate 
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changes during the event. However, because of the absence of more fundamental policy 
actions, their results should not be interpreted as a rationale for the longer-term management 
of exchange rates. 
Payne and Vitale (2003) study the effects of Swiss National Bank (SNB) intervention 
operations using tick-by-tick transaction data between 1986 and 1995. The main contribution 
of their study is to extend the preliminary analysis of Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) by 
matching these data with indicative intra-day exchange rate quotes and newswire reports of 
central bank activity. Using an event study approach, Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) exactly 
quantified the effects of single intervention operations on the USD/CHF rate at a 15-minute 
sampling frequency. Their study focuses on the signalling hypothesis, which suggests that 
intervention operations are used by monetary authorities to convey information to FX 
markets and hence alter market expectations and exchange rates. Therefore, if central bank 
operations are informative, signed intervention should have a significant and permanent 
effect on the value of currencies. Fischer and Zurlinden’s (1999) analysis suggests four 
important findings. First, SNB intervention operations have strong and persistent short-run 
effects on the USD/CHF. Second, SNB interventions are more effective in conditioning 
exchange rates when they are coordinated with other central banks. Third, interventions 
which are with-the-trend have stronger exchange rate impacts. Finally, the exchange rate can 
move in the direction of the intervention in the minutes before the actual intervention takes 
place. 
Pierdzioch and Stadtmann (2003) use the event study methodology to analyse the 
effects of interventions conducted by the Swiss National Bank (SNB) during the period from 
1986 through 1995. Like Fatum and Hutchison (2003), Pierdzioch and Stadtmann (2003) 
define the direction, smoothing and reversal criteria, and apply the nonparametric sign test 
and matched-sample test. They find some evidence that interventions by the SNB had an 
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impact on exchange rate dynamics. However, the significance of this effect depends on the 
direction of intervention. In general, evidence suggests that the SNB interventions to 
strengthen the Swiss franc were more effective than its interventions to weaken the Swiss 
franc. In addition, the results of the tests for the effects of the SNB interventions depend upon 
the length of the pre- and post-event windows analysed. 
Using published official daily data on the Bank of Japan’s intervention during the 
period from 1 April 1991 to 31 December 2000, Fatum and Hutchison (2006) apply an event 
study methodology to investigate the effects of intervention. They use the direction, 
smoothing and reversal criteria to examine the effects of the intervention episode, and employ 
two statistical tests:  nonparametric sign test and matched-sample test. The nonparametric 
sign test verifies whether there is a change in direction or reversal of the exchange rate 
following an intervention event. The matched-sample test, which is identified with the 
smoothing criterion, verifies whether there is a significant shift in the exchange rate change 
between the pre- and the post-event periods. Pre- and post-event window lengths of 2, 5, 10 
and 15 days are applied. According to the results of the nonparametric sign test and matched-
sample test, Fatum and Hutchison (2006) find strong evidence that sterilized intervention 
systemically affects the exchange rate in the short run (less than one month). This result holds 
even when intervention is associated with (simultaneous) interest rate changes, whether or 
not intervention is ‘secret’, and against other robustness checks, such as controlling for 
endogeneity (when the central bank intervenes for multiple days during a single event). 
Using an event study approach to test high-frequency (5-minute) euro-dollar exchange 
rates from 4 January 1999 to 17 May 2002, Jansen and Haan (2007) examine the effects of 
oral intervention. Focusing on direction, smoothing and volatility, they find that the effects of 
oral interventions are small and short-lived. Whether or not the verbal intervention is 
captured in the news report headline is the most important determinant of the effects. Oral 
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interventions which coincide with the release of macroeconomic data are less effective in 
changing the direction of the exchange rate, but do lead to lower exchange rate volatility. 
There is no difference between the effects of comments by European Central Bank Executive 
Board members and those of presidents of national central banks. 
Fatum (2008) uses an event study methodology to analyse the effects of official, daily 
Bank of Canada intervention in the CAD/USD exchange rate over the 1995-1998 period. 
Like Fatum and Hutchison (2006), Fatum (2008) applies the nonparametric sign test and 
matched sample test to study the main dimensions of the effects, namely direction, smoothing, 
and volatility. He finds some evidence that during the period examined intervention was 
systematically associated with both a change in the direction and a smoothing of the 
exchange rate. This means that daily Bank of Canada intervention was effective for both the 
direction and smoothing criteria. However, the analysis does not find any significant effects 
of intervention in terms of reducing volatility of the CAD/USD exchange rate.  
Fatum (2008) also takes into account the issue of currency co-movements. According 
to Eun and Lai (2004), the observed exchange rate movements might be driven by major 
currency factors. Therefore, Fatum (2008) uses the ‘filtered’ exchange rate to check for 
currency co-movements. The ‘filtered’ exchange rate is calculated as the difference between 
the % change in the ‘raw’ CAD/USD rate and an equally weighted average of the % change 
in the GBP/USD, DEM/USD and JPY/USD exchange rates. Fatum (2008) shows that the 
effects of intervention are weakened when the model is adjusted to capture the general 
currency co-movements against the USD. 
Using Japanese data over 1992-2004 and an event study approach, Gnabo and 
Teiletche (2009) estimate the effect of different strategies on the USD/JPY exchange-rate 
risk-neutral density. Like Fratzscher (2004, 2006 and 2008), they find that communication 
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policy can play a significant role in the exchange rate policy. More generally, transparent 
policies (actual and oral interventions) have greater effect than do secret policies. The results 
indicate that the effects are achieved mainly through the coordination channel and the 
signalling channel. Moreover, the effect is greater when policies involve a financial cost 
(risk), suggesting that simple announcements can be considered as only an imperfect 
substitute for actual interventions. 
 
4.1.2. Event Studies in Emerging Markets 
Leon and Williams (2012) contribute to the literature on the effects of intervention by 
analysing a unique daily data set for the Dominican Republic, covering 1997-2005, thereby 
providing a case study for small developing and emerging markets. A matched-sample test 
shows that sterilized intervention by the central bank can produce its effects in the short term 
in terms of the direction and reversal of exchange rate movements. The authors also use 
alternative event window definitions and alternative criteria to check the robustness of their 
results on the intervention effects. Their paper finds that the Dominican Republic authorities 
were following a policy of ‘leaning-against-the-wind’, aimed at either smoothing the 
exchange rate or reversing the trend direction, and that they were successful in keeping the 
exchange rate within a ‘target’ corridor. Furthermore, the results reveal two objectives of 
intervention in the Dominican foreign exchange market, namely ensuring and maintaining 
export competitiveness. The findings suggest that the authorities intervened in part due to the 
‘fear of floating’, in particular fear of strong appreciation that could conflict with their 
objective of ensuring competitiveness. In addition, the results imply that interventions can be 
used effectively in emerging market economies and developing countries to contribute 
towards maintaining export competitiveness, while containing imported inflation. These 
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findings constitute an interesting case study, which suggests that intervention can be an 
appropriate policy tool in some small open and emerging market economies. 
There is great controversy as to which exchange rate model should be used or which 
channel should be considered when measuring the effects of exchange rate policy. Since most 
of the literature relies on structural models to address the identification problem, the validity 
of the results largely depends on how accurate the assumptions are in describing the full 
extent of the economy. Using an event study approach, Echavarria et al. (2013) compare the 
effects of different types of central bank intervention for the Colombian case during the 
period 2000-2012, without imposing restrictive parametric assumptions and without the need 
to adopt a structural model. Following Fatum and Hutchison (2003), they define four criteria 
to evaluate the effects of intervention: direction, reversal, smoothing, and matching. 
Echavarria et al. (2013) find that all types of intervention (international reserve accumulation 
options, volatility options and discretionary) have been successful according to the smoothing 
criterion, with volatility options having the strongest effect. Results are robust when using 
different window sizes and counterfactuals. Two counterfactual exercises are conducted. First, 
they consider the evolution of the Brazilian exchange rate in periods corresponding to pre- 
and post-Colombian volatility interventions. Second, they consider periods in which volatility 
options should have been conducted if the intervention rule was in place, but were not, 
because the board of the central bank decided to suspend interventions in that period. 
 
4.2.An Event Study Methodology for This Paper 
In this section, we begin by defining the length of the intervention event, or the ‘event 
window’. This comprises the pre-event days (also known as the estimation window), the 
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event day or days, and the post-event days (MacKinlay, 1997).  Thereafter, some measure of 
a successful event is established. 
The reason for choosing the event study approach to analyse intervention is that 
communication tends to happen in clusters. In certain periods several interventions may occur 
within a few days, while on other days there are no interventions (MacKinlay, 1997). The 
most likely explanation for this lies in the fact that monetary authorities often continue to use 
sequent interventions until they achieve a certain objective or else realize the efforts are in 
vain. 
In finance, many events, such as earnings announcements or issuance of new debt, 
may take place on a single day. However, it is problematic to define each single day on which 
exchange rate communication occurs as a separate event. The pre- and post-event windows 
allow us to compare exchange rate movements around the defined event. Since the central 
bank often intervenes on consecutive days, a one-day event definition would lead to other 
one-day events happening within the pre- and post-event windows around one-day events. 
Therefore, exchange rate movements around one-day events might be caused by other one-
day events occurring during the pre- and post-event windows. This would make the event 
study useless. For example, in the period 18-24 May 2007, exchange rate communications 
between the PBOC governor and the US Treasury Secretary occurred on six consecutive days, 
all around the theme of appreciation of the Chinese yuan. These six days should naturally be 
viewed as a single event. 
Another important issue is to define the length of the event window. On the one hand, 
the longer the event window is, the more interventions will be clustered. If the event period is 
set too long, then it may put together interventions that should belong to different 
intervention episodes. On the other hand, if the event period is set too short, then it may 
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separate into different events interventions that should belong to one intervention episode. 
Furthermore, too-short event periods may lead to a number of overlapping event windows. 
Therefore, we define an event as a period of days with exchange rate communication 
tending in one direction, pushing for either appreciation or depreciation, and perhaps 
including a number of days without intervention. In addition, to select the appropriate length 
of event windows, we need to decide how many consecutive days of no intervention should 
be included. 
Following Hutchison (2002), Fatum and Hutchison (2003), and Fratzscher (2012), we 
set the lengths of the pre- and post-event windows to be two, five, ten and fifteen days. This 
variety of event window length also means that the results can be employed in the robustness 
checks for different model specifications. 
Following Fatum and Hutchison (2006), Fratzscher (2008), and Echavarria et al. 
(2013), we look at the dimensions of the effects of an intervention. Specifically, these 
dimensions involve intervention outcomes in relation to exchange rate changes (∆𝑠) before 
(‘pre’), after (‘post’) and during the event (‘eve’); the average exchange rate change (∆𝑠)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 
and the event type or objective of the intervention event (𝐼). We standardize exchange rate 
return by an estimated standard deviation for RMB exchange rate, as one solution to the 
heteroscedasticity is to standardize return (Ederington et al., 2015). Based on Jaffe (1974), 
Mandelker (1974) and Patell (1976), we calculate standardized returns as follows: 
∆st = ert σt⁄ ,                                                                                                                           (4) 
where ert is RMB exchange rate return (logRMBt − logRMBt−1), and σt is an estimate of the 
standard deviation of the ert. 
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To capture different directions of exchange rate movements, we set  𝐼<0 to indicate an 
attempt to strengthen the domestic currency and 𝐼>0 an attempt to weaken it. The ‘event’ 
type is used when investigating whether the direction of change to the RMB exchange rate is 
related to the interventions during the event; that is, whether or not an oral intervention leads 
to strengthening of the Chinese yuan: 
(∆𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒 > 0, 𝐼 > 0) 𝑜𝑟 (∆𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒 < 0, 𝐼 < 0)                                                                        (5) 
Frankel (1994) argues that a suitable criterion to determine whether exchange rate 
movement is in the direction desired by the central bank is simply whether the direction of 
the movement is the same as the direction entailed in the central bank’s intervention 
operation. For example, intervention carried out by selling the foreign currency should lead to 
a drop in its price. If the actual price of the foreign currency on the foreign exchange market 
declines, then one can say that the exchange rate movement is in the direction desired by the 
central bank. Therefore, in this paper, the ‘direction’ dimension is defined as positive if the 
exchange rate movement over the post-event window is in the desired direction, and negative 
otherwise: 
(∆𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 > 0, 𝐼 > 0) 𝑜𝑟 (∆𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 < 0, 𝐼 < 0)                                                                           (6) 
The next dimension of the intervention effects, ‘reversal’, refers to whether the 
intervention succeeds in appreciating (depreciating) the currency after the event if the 
exchange rate had been depreciating (appreciating) before the event: 
(∆𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 > 0, 𝐼 > 0  𝑖𝑓 ∆𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒 < 0) 𝑜𝑟 (∆𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 < 0, 𝐼 < 0   𝑖𝑓 ∆𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒 > 0)                            (7) 
Although the fourth dimension, ‘smoothing’, also considers the pre-event period, it is 
less demanding. This concept investigates whether intervention has reduced or smoothed the 
strength of the pre-event exchange rate movements: 
27 
 
(∆𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 > ∆𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒, 𝐼 > 0  𝑖𝑓 ∆𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒 < 0)  
 𝑜𝑟 (∆𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 < ∆𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒, 𝐼 < 0   𝑖𝑓 ∆𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒 > 0)                                                                           (8) 
Overall, testing of the reversal dimension is the most demanding of the four tests. This 
is because the direction test does not consider the pre-event period, and the smoothing test 
does not require the exchange rate to appreciate after intervention by the central bank. 
It is natural to begin by considering the application of parametric tests to check the 
effect of oral intervention. However, parametric tests are valid only if the variable’s 
distribution is normal. It is known that distribution of the daily changes of the exchange rate 
departs from the normal distribution. Results of formal statistical analysis of the intervention 
variable are presented in Table 4. From the table, we can see that the exchange rate change 
variable fails to pass the JB normality test. In addition, the skewness is greater than 0 and the 
kurtosis is far away from 3. This evidence all points to the eventuality that the distribution of 
daily changes of exchange rate is not normal. In this case, parametric tests are not appropriate. 
However, we still use parametric tests, together with nonparametric tests. We can then 
compare the results of the two types of test. 
 
Table 4 
Descriptive statistics for exchange rate changes 
 Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Oral 
intervention 
2087 -0.001 0.007 -0.131 7.813 2020.421 
[0.000]*** 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
We then choose the nonparametric test for our model, which does not require the 
distribution to be normal. Table 5 gives the details of parametric and nonparametric tests. We 
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use two statistical tests, the sign test and the rank test, in our nonparametric estimation. The 
reason for using the sign test is that, unlike the Wilcoxon test, it does not assume a symmetric 
distribution. In addition, Mood’s Median test focuses on testing whether the medians of two 
or more groups differ, while the Mann-Whitney test and Friedman test need two samples. The 
nonparametric sign test is used to test whether or not two groups are equally sized. Also 
called the binominal test, the sign test is based on the plus and minus sign of the observation. 
The null hypothesis is that two populations are equal or are equal in their central tendency. In 
our model, we employ the nonparametric sign test to investigate whether there is no 
difference between the exchange rate movements before and following the intervention 
events in terms of the event and direction. Following the generalized sign test (Brown and 
Warner, 1980, 1985), our null hypothesis is that the number of positive values (‘success’) (𝑛+) 
is the same as the number of negative values (‘non-success’) (𝑛−). If the hypothesis is correct, 
the probability of successful events is the same as that of non-successful events. A sign test 
based on a binomial distribution checks whether the probability of a ‘successful event’ (𝑝) is 
greater than 0.5 (𝑛+~𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝑛, 𝑝 = 0.5)), where  𝑛 is the total number of events. 
 
Table 5 
Description of Nonparametric and Parametric Tests 
Nonparametric tests Alternative parametric tests 
Sign test 1-sample Z-test, 1-sample t-test 
Wilcoxon test 1-sample Z-test, 1-sample t-test 
Mann-Whitney test 2-sample t-test 
Rank test One-way ANOVA 
Mood’s Median test One-way ANOVA 
Friedman test Two-way ANOVA 
Notes: ANOVA stands for analysis of variance, which can be employed to analyse the differences  
among group means. 
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The sign test is a relatively weak test, since it tests the pair value below or above the 
median only, but does not measure the pair difference. There is another nonparametric test, 
known as the rank test. Based on the Wilcoxon rank test and developed by Corrado (1989) 
and Corrado and Zivney (1992), the rank text, like the sign test, does not require distribution 
symmetry (Dutta, 2014). The null hypothesis of this test is that the rank of exchange rate 
changes is equal to the mean of total observations (‘success’). Under the null hypothesis, the 
rank of exchange rate changes is uniform distribution (Corrado, 1989). We use the rank test 
to check the effects of intervention in terms of exchange rate reversal and smoothing. The 
rank test statistic is given by: 
𝑅 =
𝐾𝑡−?̅?
𝑆(𝐾)
                                                                                                                                 (9) 
where 𝐾𝑖 is the rank of exchange rate changes; ?̅? is the average rank (?̅? =
𝑇+1
2
, 𝑇 is the 
number of observations); 𝑆(𝐾) is the standard deviation, and is calculated as: 
𝑆(𝐾) = √
1
𝑇
∑ (𝐾𝑡 − ?̅?)2
𝑇
𝑡=1                                                                                                     (10) 
This statistic is distributed asymptotically as unit normal. 
 
5. Results of the Event Study 
5.1.Results from Parametric Tests 
In this section, we evaluate whether China’s interventions are successful based on the criteria 
given above. Table 6 displays the numbers of China’s exchange rate communication events. 
Table 7 reports the results for the success of exchange rate communication in the whole 
sample period. In each table the columns from left to right show the different event window 
lengths: 2, 5, 10 and 15 days. The rows display the total number of communications, the 
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number of successful communications (as a percentage), and the probability value for the 
four criteria. To study the first two criteria, event and direction, we use sign test based on a 
binomial distribution; the hypothesis is that the number of successful events is the same as 
the number of non-successful events. The remaining criteria are tested by the rank test; here, 
the hypothesis is that the rank of exchange rate changes is equal to the mean of total 
observations. 
 
Table 6 
Number of exchange rate communication events 
  2𝑎  5𝑏  10𝑐  15𝑑  
Total Comm. Num.  270 187 120 85 
𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1  100 76 57 44 
𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1  170 111 63 41 
Notes:  a. pre- and post-event window length is 2 days; 
b. pre- and post-event window length is 5 days; 
c. pre- and post-event window length is 10 days; 
             d. pre- and post-event window length is 15 days. 
 
As can be seen from Table 6, for the 2-day pre- and post-event windows the number 
of appreciating communications (𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1) is larger than that of depreciating 
communications (𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1), accounting for 63% of the total. However, the difference between 
the numbers of appreciating and depreciating communications decreases from the 2-day 
event window to the 15-day event window, where the numbers of the two types become 
almost equal. In order to avoid overlapping communication days, the longer the event 
window length is, the more communication days are included. For example, in the 15-day 
event window, we put 12 communication days into one event, which runs from 12/04/2007 to 
21/06/2007. According to the trend of difference between the numbers of appreciating and 
depreciating events, we find that appreciating communication is more compact. In other 
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words, the authorities, especially the US President and Treasury Secretary, try to appreciate 
the RMB exchange rate with greater pressure. 
 
Table 7 
Results of one-sample t tests for event and direction and ANOVA tests for reversal and 
smoothing 
Event Window Length 2 5 10 15 
Total Num. 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1  100 76 57 44 
 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1  170 111 63 41 
Event 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1 Success %(Num.) 46%(46) 50%(38) 81%(26) 34%(15) 
  𝜌-Value 0.387 0.117 0.389 0.326 
 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1 Success %(Num.) 52%(88) 52%(58) 60%(38) 71%(29) 
  𝜌-Value 0.234 0.318 0.320 0.147 
Direction 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1 Success %(Num.) 45%(45) 37%(28) 28%(16) 34%(15) 
  𝜌-Value 0.833 0.423 0.000*** 0.006*** 
 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1 Success %(Num.) 49%(83) 55%(61) 75%(47) 78%(32) 
  𝜌-Value 0.323 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Reversal 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1 Success %(Num.) 29%(29) 37%(16) 25%(14) 20%(9) 
  𝜌-Value 0.988 0.249 0.000*** 0.436 
 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1 Success %(Num.) 19%(32) 16%(18) 16%(10) 15%(6) 
  𝜌-Value 0.902 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Smoothing 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1 Success %(Num.) 45%(45) 45%(34) 56%(32) 43%(19) 
  𝜌-Value 0.987 0.009*** 0.000*** 0.006*** 
 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1 Success %(Num.) 30%(51) 27%(30) 17%(11) 20%(8) 
  𝜌-Value 0.323 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Notes: IOt = 1 stands for oral intervention for appreciation, and IOt = −1 is oral intervention for 
depreciation. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
From Table 7, we find that interventions have no effects according to the event 
criterion, because there are no significant 𝜌-values for this criterion. Another finding is that 
the intervention is more effective in the long term than in the short term. The significances in 
10-day and 15-day event window lengths are greater than that in 2- and 5-day event window 
lengths. Late, we will also use nonparametric tests to collaborate our finding. 
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5.2.Results from Nonparametric Tests 
 
Table 8 
Results of sign tests for event and direction and rank tests for reversal and smoothing 
Event Window Length 2 5 10 15 
Total 
Num. 
𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1  100 76 57 44 
 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1  170 111 63 41 
Event 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1 Success %(Num.) 46%(46) 50%(38) 81%(26) 34%(15) 
  𝜌-Value 0.484 0.188 0.596 0.050** 
 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1 Success %(Num.) 52%(88) 52%(58) 60%(38) 71%(29) 
  𝜌-Value 0.701 0.704 0.131 0.012** 
Direction 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1 Success %(Num.) 45%(45) 37%(28) 28%(16) 34%(15) 
  𝜌-Value 0.368 0.029** 0.001*** 0.050** 
 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1 Success %(Num.) 49%(83) 55%(61) 75%(47) 78%(32) 
  𝜌-Value 0.818 0.343 0.000*** 0.001*** 
Reversal 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1 Success %(Num.) 29%(29) 37%(16) 25%(14) 20%(9) 
  𝜌-Value 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 
 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1 Success %(Num.) 19%(32) 16%(18) 16%(10) 15%(6) 
  𝜌-Value 0.007*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Smoothing 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1 Success %(Num.) 45%(45) 45%(34) 56%(32) 43%(19) 
  𝜌-Value 0.160 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.012** 
 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1 Success %(Num.) 30%(51) 27%(30) 17%(11) 20%(8) 
  𝜌-Value 0.424 0.211 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Notes: IOt = 1 stands for oral intervention for appreciation, and IOt = −1 is oral intervention for 
depreciation. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 8 shows the results from the sign tests based on the event and direction of exchange 
rate movements, and results from the rank test based on the reversal and smoothing criteria 
for successfulness of an event. From these results, we can find that: 1) the exchange rate 
communication events have no effect according to the event criterion; 2) all event window 
lengths are significant in terms of the reversal effect; 3) the longer the event window length is, 
the more significant the oral intervention effects. Compared with the results from parametric 
tests, we find that nonparametric tests have more significant 𝜌-values. 
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For the event dimension, both appreciating and depreciating communications have no 
effects. The only significant communication effects are at the 15-day event window length. 
This means that China’s exchange rate communication cannot impact the exchange rate 
movement during the event. This finding is the same as that from the parametric tests. 
Another notable phenomenon is that, in terms of the direction and smoothing dimensions, 
oral intervention events are significant at the 5% and 1% levels only at the 10- and 15-day 
event window lengths. This means that the communication intervention has a property of 
leaning-against-the-wind, and the strength of pre-event exchange rate movements tends to 
diminish two weeks after the oral intervention. Reversal is the only dimension for which the 
communication events are significant at all event window lengths. In other words, if the 
exchange rate was depreciating before the event, oral intervention can be effective in 
appreciating the RMB after the event; alternatively, if the currency was appreciating before 
the event, the intervention can be effective in depreciating the RMB. 
Based on the difference between the results at different event window lengths, we can 
see that the effects of oral intervention via exchange rate communication are more obvious in 
the longer term than in the short term. Communications have more significance in the 10- and 
15-day event window lengths, and especially in the latter. This suggests that, in the Chinese 
context, oral intervention via exchange rate communication would have greater effect on the 
RMB exchange rate after two weeks. This finding further confirms the robustness of the 
parametric test results. 
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Table 9 
Robust tests 
Event Window Length 2 5 10 15 
Total 
Num. 
𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1  100 76 57 44 
 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1  170 111 63 41 
Event 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1 Wilcoxon signed rank test 0.622 0.758 0.471 0.000*** 
 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1 Wilcoxon signed rank test 0.173 0.230 0.191 0.032** 
Direction 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1 Wilcoxon signed rank test 0.160 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.012** 
 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1 Wilcoxon signed rank test 0.422 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Reversal 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1 Cochran’s Q test 0.029** 0.016** 0.000*** 0.006*** 
  Skillings-Mack test 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.003*** 
  Kruskal-Wallis test 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1 Cochran’s Q test 0.016** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  Skillings-Mack test 0.050** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  Kruskal-Wallis test 0.012** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Smoothing 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1 Cochran’s Q test 0.088* 0.025** 0.001*** 0.131 
  Skillings-Mack test 0.317 0.028** 0.001*** 0.035** 
  Kruskal-Wallis test 0.150 0.150 0.018** 0.050** 
 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1 Cochran’s Q test 0.180 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
  Skillings-Mack test 0.635 0.178 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  Kruskal-Wallis test 0.992 0.014** 0.021** 0.030** 
Notes: IOt = 1 stands for oral intervention for appreciation, and IOt = −1 is oral intervention for 
depreciation. Figures displayed in the table are 𝜌 values for the relevant tests. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 9 reports the results of robustness testing, using non-parametric statistical 
hypothesis tests including the Wilcoxon signed rank test for the event and direction criteria, 
the Cochran’s Q test, the Skillings-Mack test, and the Kruskal-Wallis test for the reversal and 
smoothing criteria. The outcome of the Wilcoxon signed rank test exhibits a similar patter as 
that of the sign test. The test results generally accept the null and reject the alternative 
suggesting that intervention through communication is not efficacious in the event criterion. 
Only at the longer event window length (15 days) the null is rejected, indicating 
communication intervention would only be effective after some longer delay. In the direction 
criterion, oral intervention is again effective only after longer lags. These results are 
consistent with the sign test outcome, and hence indicate robustness of the results from the 
sign test.   
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For the robustness of the rank test that checks the effects of intervention in terms of 
reversal and smoothing criteria, results of the Cochran’s Q test, Skillings-Mack test, Kruskal-
Wallis are generally significant. The significance of the smoothing dimension confirms that 
China takes a leaning-against-the-wind strategy of intervention. Consistent with the rank test, 
reversal criterion proves significant at all event window lengths. This outcome suggests that 
if the RMB exchange rate was depreciating before the event, oral intervention can effectively 
change it to appreciating after the event; and vice versa. Again, these results confirm that the 
results of the rank test are maintained in additional nonparametric tests. 
 
5.3.Specific Results for Domestic and External Communications 
Oral intervention in the RMB exchange rate has two sources: domestic and external. The US 
authorities have for a long time tried to pressurise China to appreciate the RMB exchange 
rate. Here, we examine to what extent exchange rate communications initiated by the US may 
influence the RMB exchange rate. In particular, the US Treasury is required by Congress to 
submit a half-yearly examination report on China’s currency issues. If China were found to 
be manipulating the RMB exchange rate, US law requires that the US government must 
impose punitive tariffs on imports from China. In order to avoid this punitive action, the 
Chinese government seems responsive to the oral intervention via such reports and would, in 
most cases, appreciate the exchange rate secretly. 
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Table 10 
Parametric and nonparametric tests for domestic and external communications 
Type Domestic External  
Event Window Length 2 15 2 15 
Total 
Num. 
𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1  100 44 0 0 
 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1  78 48 119 41 
Event 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1 Success %(Num.) 46%(46) 34%(15)   
  Parametric test 0.706 0.868   
  Nonparametric test 0.484 0.050**   
 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1 Success %(Num.) 46%(36) 56%(27) 55%(65) 71%(29) 
  Parametric test 0.669 0.914 0.012** 0.010*** 
  Nonparametric test 0.571 0.470 0.359 0.012*** 
Direction 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1 Success %(Num.) 45%(45) 34%(15)   
  Parametric test 0.031** 0.013**   
  Nonparametric test 0.368 0.050**   
 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1 Success %(Num.) 51%(40) 77%(37) 47%(56) 73%(30) 
  Parametric test 0.091* 0.000*** 0.160 0.001*** 
  Nonparametric test 0.910 0.000*** 0.582 0.005*** 
Reversal 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1 Success %(Num.) 29%(29) 20%(9)   
  Parametric test 0.000*** 0.000***   
  Nonparametric test 0.005*** 0.001***   
 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1 Success %(Num.) 21%(16) 15%(7) 18%(21) 10%(4) 
  Parametric test 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.000*** 
  Nonparametric test 0.017** 0.000*** 0.017** 0.000*** 
Smoothing 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = 1 Success %(Num.) 45%(45) 43%(19)   
  Parametric test 0.031** 0.013**   
  Nonparametric test 0.317 0.035**   
 𝐼𝑂𝑡 = −1 Success %(Num.) 33%(26) 15%(7) 29%(34) 15%(6) 
  Parametric test 0.091* 0.000*** 0.160 0.001*** 
  Nonparametric test 0.821 0.000*** 0.774 0.003*** 
Notes: IOt = 1 stands for oral intervention for appreciation, and IOt = −1 is oral intervention for 
depreciation. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Relevant tests are performed to check the robustness of the nonparametric analysis. The 
robustness testing includes the Wilcoxon signed rank test, Cochran’s Q test, Skillings-Mack test and 
Kruskal-Wallis test. The outcome is consistent with the sign and rank tests confirming that 
appreciation calls from the US can impact the RMB exchange rate movements, as the Chinese 
government is responsive to pressure from the US. Robustness testing results are available upon 
request.  
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Table 10 displays the results of parametric and nonparametric tests for domestic and 
external communications. For both tests, there are more significant results for all dimensions 
of intervention effects in the 15-day event window length.  This proves the robustness of the 
finding that exchange rate communication has more effect on exchange rate movements after 
two weeks. Reversal is the only dimension of the intervention effects for which the 
communication events are significant at all event window lengths. Based on the results in 
Table 10, the appreciation exchange rate communication from the US can influence the RMB 
exchange rate movements, as the table shows that communication events are significant. The 
Chinese government is responsive to oral pressure from the US, and would initiate the RMB 
appreciation after some delay, perhaps about two weeks. 
 
5.4.Volatility Analysis 
Government intervention usually has two main objectives: to change the level of the 
exchange rate in a certain direction and to calm excessive volatility (Sarno and Taylor, 2001; 
Utsunomiya, 2013). Previous sections in this paper are mainly concerned with the first 
objective, i.e. changing the level of the exchange rate. Next, we examine the effects of oral 
intervention on the volatility of China’s currency. For this purpose, it is pertinent to use open, 
close, high and low daily exchange rates from 2005 to 2013. The data are obtained from 
Bloomberg and the event window lengths are set to be 2 days and 15 days. We investigate the 
volatility in 207 pre-event and post-event periods for the 2-day event window length, and in 
28 periods for the 15-day event window length. In other words, we calculate the range-based 
variance of the USD/RMB exchange rate during the 48 hours (2-day windows) or 360 hours 
(15-day windows) before and after each event, respectively. The formula (Garman and Klass, 
1980) to calculate the range-based variance of the USD/RMB exchange rate is shown below: 
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𝜎𝑟𝑏
2 = 0.5[ln (
𝐻𝑡
𝐿𝑡
)]2 − [2 ln(2) − 1][ln (
𝐶𝑡
𝑂𝑡
)]2.                                                                      (11) 
where 𝜎𝑟𝑏
2  is the range-based variance of the exchange rate; 𝐻𝑡 is the highest price of the 𝑡
𝑡ℎ 
trading day; 𝐿𝑡 is the lowest price of the 𝑡
𝑡ℎ trading day; 𝐶𝑡 is the closing price of the 𝑡
𝑡ℎ 
trading day; 𝑂𝑡 is the opening price of the 𝑡
𝑡ℎ trading day. 
For the event window length at 15 days, 14 events have lower post-event volatility, 
while for the 2-day event window length, 121 events have lower post-event volatility. We use 
the Kruskal-Wallis test to study whether the oral intervention can reduce volatility. The null 
hypothesis of the Kruskal-Wallis test is that the mean ranks of the two groups are the same. 
In our study, the null hypothesis is that pre-event volatility is the same as post-event volatility. 
The ranks are always whole numbers from 1 to N. We check the variation ranks among the 
groups: 
𝑆𝑆𝑇 = 𝑆𝑆𝐺 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠                                                                                                   (12) 
where 𝑆𝑆𝑇 is the total variation and 𝑆𝑆𝐺 is the variation among the groups. The test statistic 
is given by: 
𝐻 =
12
𝑁(𝑁+1)
∑
𝑅𝐴2
𝑛𝑖
− 3(𝑁 + 1),                                                                                              (13) 
where 𝑁 is the total number of observations, 𝑛𝑖 is the number of observations in group 𝑖, and 
𝑅𝐴 is the rank of observation. Table 11 shows the results of difference of volatilities between 
the pre- and post-event periods at 2- and 15-day event window lengths. Based on the results 
in Table 11, we do not find evidence of a link between oral intervention and volatility 
reduction, as no variables are significant in the test outcome. 
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Table 11 
USD/RMB exchange rate volatility during pre- and post-event windows 
Event Window Length 2 15 
Total Num.  207 28 
Event Success %(Num.) 58%(121) 50%(14) 
 𝜌-Value 0.978 0.935 
 
While we find no link between oral intervention events and exchange rate volatility, it 
should be noted that this result might be influenced by certain factors. The exchange rate 
communication data used in this paper are available only at daily frequency: we cannot know 
the exact time within the day when the communication happened, nor the length of 
communication time. In other words, the pre-event volatility window may end before the first 
day of the communication event; the communication event may take place over successive 
days; or, the post-event volatility window may start after the event has ended. 
Then, we test whether successive oral interventions can reduce volatility. Table 12 
shows the result for reducing volatility when two or more successive oral interventions 
happen. Based on Table 12, we find evidence that successive oral interventions could reduce 
volatility. Therefore, the central bank tries to calm excessive volatility by successive oral 
interventions. 
 
Table 12 
Effects of successive interventions on volatility 
 Two or more successive oral interventions 
Total Num. 48 
Success %(Num.) 58%(28) 
𝜌-Value 0.020** 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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6. Conclusions 
This research evaluates China’s exchange rate communication and its efficacy on the 
level and volatility of the RMB exchange rate. Daily data are employed to investigate the oral 
intervention effects during the sample period from 22 July 2005, when the most recent reform 
was launched to sever the rigid link between the RMB and the USD and allow the RMB to 
move within a certain band, to 22 July 2013, when the most recent data are available to this 
research. An event study approach is employed in this paper. In the empirical examination, 
we postulate that the effects of an intervention event can have four dimensions, namely event, 
direction, reversal, and smoothing. 
Given the property of the distribution of our datasets, this research uses parametric 
and nonparametric tests for the four dimensions of the oral intervention effects. The two 
samples for tests are constructed at the pre- and post-event window lengths of two, five, ten 
and fifteen days. In general, the results show that oral intervention can have effects on the 
level of the Chinese exchange rate. While the outcome shows no significant effects in the 
event dimension, all event window lengths are significant in terms of the reversal effect. 
Finally, the effect may vary with the event window length. Compared with the 2- and 5-day 
event window lengths, communications have more significant effects at the 10-day, and 
particularly the 15-day event window lengths, suggesting that in the Chinese context the most 
significant intervention effects would occur about two weeks after the exchange rate 
communication. We also find that nonparametric tests have more significant effects than 
parametric tests. 
Effects of the international aspects of China’s exchange rate communication provide 
further insights on China’s exchange rate intervention. Evidence of China’s response to calls 
from the US authorities for changes of China’s exchange rate policy, especially for exchange 
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rate appreciation confirms that the Chinese government is generally responsive to US 
pressure for RMB appreciation. But the response is moderately reluctant as it would quietly 
appreciate the exchange rate after a delay of around two weeks.  
This paper also sheds light on another objective of China’s intervention: calming 
excess volatility. We use a range-based variance model to calculate the variance. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test is used to study whether or not exchange rate communication can reduce 
volatility. We find that, regardless of the event window length, there is no evidence of a link 
between isolated oral intervention and volatility reduction. However, the results show that 
successive oral intervention can reduce volatility.  
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